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Abstract 
There is growing public concern over the rapid growth in CEO pay relative to average worker 
pay (CEO pay ratio). Critics contend that high CEO pay ratios could destroy firm value by 
damaging employee morale and/or signal CEO rent extraction. In this paper, we use a proprietary 
dataset to examine the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance. Contrary 
to critics’ arguments, we find that industry-adjusted CEO pay ratios are positively associated 
with both firm value and performance. We also find that high CEO pay ratios are associated with 
higher quality acquisitions and stronger CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results 
challenge the notion that high CEO pay ratios are on average economically harmful to the firm.     
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we use a proprietary dataset of firm-specific information on worker salaries to 
examine how the ratio of CEO compensation to that of average workers, referred to as the CEO 
pay ratio, relates to firm value and performance. This investigation is motivated by the public 
outcry over the rising CEO pay ratios and the recent attempts by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate the reporting of CEO pay ratios. The increasing CEO 
pay ratio is a key catalyst of the intense policy debate over income inequality in the U.S. For 
example, addressing a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston, Federal Reserve 
Chairwoman Janet Yellen remarked, “The extent and continuing increase in inequality in the 
United States greatly concern me… I think it is appropriate to ask whether this trend is 
compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history (Da Costa 2014).” The seemingly widening 
gap between CEO and worker pay measured in terms of the CEO pay ratio has become a main 
focal point of this debate.  
Currently, CEO pay ratio is not directly observable for U.S. firms. In September 2013, 
following a requirement of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC voted 3-2 to approve a proposal 
and seek comments on mandating firms to report their CEO pay ratio in annual proxy statements. 
The SEC approved the pay ratio disclosure rule on August 5, 2015 and it was expected to come 
into effect in 2017. However, in February 2017, the Acting Chairman of the SEC, Michael S. 
Piwowar decided to reconsider the implementation of the pay ratio disclosure rule and to seek 
more public input on the issue, prompting a possibility of delays in the adoption. However, 
despite the lack of publically available data on CEO pay ratio, a worker of a public corporation 
can compare his own pay against the CEO’s because CEO pay (and that of the five highest paid 
executives) is publicly disclosed in proxy statements. Hence, the absence of a formal CEO pay 
ratio disclosure need not preclude workers from assessing the extent of disparity between their 
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pay and that of the CEO.1  
While egalitarian notions of social justice and equality permeates much of the popular 
debate on CEO pay ratio, an important issue from an investor’s point of view is whether the large 
disparity between senior executives and average workers adversely affects firm value. There are 
at least two non-mutually exclusive reasons as to why CEO pay ratio could be negatively 
associated with firm value and performance. First, higher CEO pay ratios can reduce employee 
morale and productivity. According to Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis, 
workers have a conception of a fair wage and when the actual wage falls short of fair wage, they 
would proportionately withdraw effort or quit working altogether, thus leading to a decrease in 
firm value and performance. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that workers’ conception of the 
“fairness” of their pay is based not only on market factors but also on how their pay compares 
against that of others, including senior executives of their own firm.2 In fact, Wade, O’Reilly III, 
and Pollock (2006) note that CEO pay serves as a key reference point in employees’ assessment 
of whether their own pay is “fair.” If large disparities between worker pay and CEO pay result in 
lower productivity, we would expect firms with higher CEO pay ratios to be associated with 
poorer operating performances and lower firm values.      
Prior research provides some support for the notion that disparities between worker and 
executive pay affects employee productivity. In an experimental setting, Martin (1982) finds that 
when the pay differential between blue-collar workers and management is large, workers express 
stronger feelings of dissatisfaction and injustice. Wade, O’Reilly III, and Pollock (2006) find that 
lower-level managers are more likely to leave the organization when they are underpaid relative 
to the CEO. In an influential paper that uses data from 102 business units of 41 corporations, 
Cowherd and Levine (1992) report that lower disparity between top management and worker pay 
                                                     
1 In contrast, comparing their pay against others in the hierarchy such as immediate supervisors and regional 
managers would be more difficult because most firms enforce a policy of secrecy with respect to wages and salaries.    
2 Akerlof and Yellen (1990) motivate this concept based on relative deprivation theory (Martin 1981).  
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is associated with higher product quality. They attribute this finding to higher levels of 
commitment, effort, and cooperation expended by workers in settings where relative pay is 
conceived as more equitable and argue that the economic significance of their finding is material 
enough to reduce total production costs and increase market share and profitability. 
Second, high CEO pay ratios can reflect CEO rent extraction in firms with weak corporate 
governance. For example, Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) argue that high levels of 
dispersion between CEO pay and the pay of other senior executives indicate CEO rent extraction 
and governance failure. As rank-and-file workers of a firm have less ability to extract rent, a high 
CEO pay ratio could signal the presence of an overcompensated CEO. Since a large body of 
literature documents weak corporate governance to be associated with lower firm values and 
poor performance (e.g., Yermack 1996; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Cremers and Nair 
2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007), a link can be made 
between high CEO pay ratios and lower firm values and poor performances as well. It is 
important to note that this rent extraction argument does not necessarily suggest a causal link 
between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance. Rather, both high CEO pay ratios and sub-
par firm value/performance are symptomatic of the underlying corporate governance failures.   
On the other hand, it could also be argued that high CEO pay ratios reflect firms’ ability to 
secure superior CEO talent that is scarce and critical to successful running of large and complex 
modern corporations. Proponents of optimal contracting contend that executive compensation 
arrangements are efficient mechanisms designed to address agency problems between managers 
and shareholders and to secure scarce CEO talent (e.g., Gabaix and Landier 2008; Terviö 2008; 
Edmans et al 2009; Murphy 2013). Over the years, U.S. corporations have been growing both in 
size and complexity. Talents of senior executives such as CEOs are more scalable because 
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decisions made by individuals at higher levels of the organization have firm-wide implications.3 
On the other hand, the firm-wide impact of a single rank-and-file worker is likely to be marginal 
at best. Therefore, the incremental talent/ability at the CEO level commands a disproportionately 
greater increase in compensation than the incremental talent/ability at the worker level.4 
Accordingly, from an efficient contracting viewpoint, a widening gap between CEO and worker 
pay can be seen as inevitable in an environment marked by larger and more complex business 
organizations. Along these lines, it could be argued that a wider disparity between CEO pay and 
average worker pay reflects firms’ success in securing a more talented CEO. To the extent that 
this argument is valid and that more talented CEOs produce superior results, one may postulate 
firms with higher CEO pay ratios to exhibit higher value and superior performance.5  
However, not all agree that CEO pay ratios provide any useful information let alone 
impacting firm value/performance. Some contend that a meaningful comparison of CEO pay and 
average worker pay is impossible because these two groups operate in entirely different labor 
markets with almost no overlap. Moreover, a significant portion of CEO compensation is driven 
by equity pay (stock and option awards) used to align CEO interest with that of shareholders.6 
This sentiment of irrelevance is distinctly evident in SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher’s 
dissenting statement on the proposal to implement the pay ratio disclosure provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Act: “There are no – count them, zero – benefits that our staff have been able to 
                                                     
3 Along these lines, Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008) argue that best CEOs manage the largest firms 
because it maximizes their impact and economic efficiency. 
4 To provide a numerical example, assume that a worker who is 10 percent more talented than the average worker 
receives a pay 10 percent higher than that of the average worker. Scalability argument suggests that the pay 
incremental commanded by a CEO who is 10 percent more talented than the average CEO is significantly greater 
than 10 percent.   
5 The tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981) offers another argument for a positive relationship between pay 
disparity and firm performance where higher inter-hierarchy pay disparities promote competition and induce more 
effort. However, the tournament theory is unlikely to be applicable in our setting because rank-and-file employees 
do not compete for the CEO’s job.   
6 For example, see the comment letter to SEC by the Center for Capital Market Competitiveness 
(https://www.sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/cll3-1664896-148926.pdf).   
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discern”.7 
Hence, whether, and if so, how the CEO pay ratio is associated with firm value and 
operating performance is an empirical question. Despite the timeliness and importance of this 
issue, research on CEO pay ratio is rather scant, primarily due to the difficulties in obtaining 
firm-level worker pay data. We overcome this data challenge by using a proprietary dataset of 
firm-level average worker pay, made available to us by PayScale.com.8   
We obtain CEO pay ratios for 817 firms and measure firm value and operating 
performance based on one-year-ahead Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA), respectively. We 
isolate the effect of CEO pay ratio by controlling for a comprehensive set of firm characteristics 
that might affect Tobin’s q and ROA, as suggested in prior research. We also industry-adjust 
both the CEO pay ratio and measures of firm value/performance to ensure that the results are not 
driven by the variations in pay ratio and value/performance across industries. Moreover, we 
control for contemporaneous Tobin’s q and accounting performance to allay concerns of 
endogeneity and reverse causality.  
Our results reveal a significantly positive association between CEO pay ratio and one-year-
ahead Tobin’s q, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher CEO pay ratios have higher 
market value. The economic magnitude of this effect, though not excessive, is quite significant; a 
one-standard deviation increase in CEO pay ratio is associated with a relative increase in Tobin’s 
q of about two percent. In examinations of firm performance, we find that CEO pay ratio is 
positively associated with one-year-ahead ROA as well. A one-standard deviation increase in 
CEO pay ratio is associated with an increase of 0.55 to 0.63 percentage points in one-year-ahead 
ROA, or a relative increase of 13 to 15 percent. Taken together, these findings indicate that 
reductions in worker productivity (if any) due to high disparity between CEO pay and average 
                                                     
7 https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013-09-18-open-meeting-statement-dmg 
8 See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of PayScale data.  
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worker pay are not significant enough to have firm-wide value and performance implications. 
They are also inconsistent with the notion that high CEO pay ratios signal governance failures 
and CEO rent extraction. In contrast, our results are consistent with the argument that firms with 
high CEO pay ratios are likely to be managed by more capable CEOs.  
Next, to provide additional insights and to increase the credibility of the inference that high 
pay ratios on average indicate superior CEO talent instead of governance failures, we examine 
the relationship between CEO pay ratio and two corporate decisions that are closely associated 
with the CEO: shareholder value creation through acquisitions and CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity. These analyses enable us to further distinguish between the two competing 
arguments. First, acquisitions are important corporate investment decisions with direct CEO 
involvement, where more capable CEOs make better acquisitions (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1990), while CEO rent extraction and governance failures lead to poor acquisition 
choices (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007).  Therefore, if high 
CEO pay ratios indicate the employment of more capable CEOs, we would expect a positive 
relationship between CEO pay ratio and the quality of acquisitions, and the opposite if high pay 
ratios are indicative of CEO rent extraction and governance failure. Following prior research 
(e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011), we use abnormal stock 
returns surrounding acquisition announcements to capture the quality of acquisitions. We find a 
positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and these abnormal returns. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that CEOs of high pay ratio firms make better acquisition decisions, 
corroborating the finding of the positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance.  
Second, with respect to CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, prior research finds that 
entrenched CEOs in poorly-governed firms are less likely to be replaced following poor 
performance (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997). If high CEO pay ratios are 
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symptomatic of CEO rent extraction and governance failures, we expect to find a negative 
association between CEO pay ratio and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Instead, we find 
that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance increases with CEO pay ratio, as CEOs 
with high pay ratios are more likely to be replaced following poor performance, which is 
inconsistent with the CEO entrenchment argument. This finding further strengthens our inference 
that, on average, high CEO pay ratios are not symptomatic of governance failures.  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to ensure that our results are robust and to 
provide further insights. First, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that CEOs are rewarded 
for good firm performance even when such performance is attributable to external factors that 
are beyond their control. One might argue that the positive relationship between CEO pay ratio 
and firm value/performance stems from this pay-for-luck phenomenon that firms with good 
performance due to external factors award CEOs disproportionally higher compensation than the 
average workers, leading to a higher CEO pay ratio. However, we do not believe this to be the 
case because our measures of firm value and performance are industry-adjusted, thus 
significantly removing effects of external factors that are beyond CEOs’ control. Besides, our 
empirical specifications capture the relationship between CEO pay ratio in the current period and 
firm value/performance in the next period after controlling for contemporaneous firm 
value/performance. The current period’s CEO compensation in dollar amount is unlikely to be 
set by the board based on future performance, particularly future stock returns, which are not 
predictable. Moreover, the corroborative findings based on the quality of acquisitions and CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity cannot be explained by the pay-for-luck phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, we carry out an additional analysis to further rule out this alternative explanation. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that better governed firms have a lower pay-for-luck 
propensity. Hence, if our main results are driven by this phenomenon, we would expect the 
relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance to be weaker for better 
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governed firms. However, we find some weak evidence that the relationship between CEO pay 
ratio and firm value is stronger for better governed firms, in contrary to the predictions based on 
the pay-for-luck phenomenon.  
Second, motivated by the concern that CEO pay ratio should not provide any useful 
information in and of itself, we examine whether our results are driven by the pay levels of CEOs 
or workers, as opposed to the pay ratio itself. For this purpose, we include CEO and worker 
compensation levels separately as additional control variables in the regression models. Our 
inferences remain the same, suggesting that the ratio of CEO to worker pay is incrementally 
informative over and above the pay levels of each group.   
Third, another alternative explanation for our results is that firms with more CEO stock-
based compensation have higher CEO pay and thus higher CEO pay ratio and these firms also 
have higher firm value. While controlling for CEO pay level addresses this concern to a certain 
extent, in an additional analysis, we explicitly control for CEO pay structure in terms of stock 
versus cash compensation in the regressions. Our inferences remain the same. 
Fourth, while CEO compensation includes deferred compensation such as pension, our 
worker pay data from PayScale.com might not fully account for workers’ deferred compensation 
components. To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by this potential issue, we run 
additional analyses by excluding CEO deferred compensation in our measure of pay ratio. The 
inferences remain the same.  
Fifth, the proposed SEC regulations mandate the inclusion of foreign workers when 
computing the pay ratio, but due to data constraints the worker pay captured in our analyses 
consists of pay for domestic workers only. Hence, one potential concern is that our findings are 
driven by firms with significant foreign operations. We allay this concern by replicating our 
analyses after excluding firms with significant foreign operations from the sample. Our 
inferences remain unchanged.   
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Sixth, we investigate whether the relation between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance is non-linear. We find some evidence that the relationship between pay ratio 
and ROA is concave; ROA increases with CEO pay ratio in a decreasing rate.  
Finally, the arguments for CEO pay ratio also apply to other senior executives. We 
investigate whether the ratio of total compensation of the top four executives other than the CEO 
to that of the average worker is associated with firm value and performance. Consistent with the 
findings on CEO pay ratio, we find that the top executive to average worker pay ratio is also 
positively associated with future Tobin’s q and ROA.      
As a whole, our results are consistent with the argument that high CEO pay ratios are 
indicative of firms’ ability to secure highly sought-after managerial talent, which are scarce, but 
vital to the successful running of modern corporations. Our findings do not support the 
conjecture that high pay disparity between senior executives and rank-and-file workers adversely 
affects the firm by damaging employee morale and productivity. They are also inconsistent with 
the argument that high pay ratios are symptomatic of governance failures and CEO rent 
extraction. We believe that our study contributes to the debate on the increasing and high CEO 
pay ratios. Hence, our study should be of interest not only to academics and policymakers but 
also to the general public. However, it is worth noting that public outcry over high CEO pay 
ratios also centers around concerns over the perceived deterioration in social justice and fairness. 
While an association of high pay ratios with undesirable corporate outcomes could be construed 
as prima facie evidence of CEOs receiving unfairly high compensation, a positive association 
between CEO pay ratio and desirable corporate outcomes, as documented in this study, cannot be 
considered as sufficient evidence that corporate pay practices are indeed fair. This broader issue 
of fairness is beyond the scope of our paper.  
Our study is closely related to two recent papers on pay ratio; Faleye et al. (2013) and 
Crawford et al. (2014). While these studies also document a positive association between pay 
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ratio and firm performance, they investigate the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
performance in more restrictive settings. Faleye et al. (2013) restrict their sample to firms that 
voluntarily disclose total compensation expense while Crawford et al.’s (2014) investigation is 
limited to the banking industry. Hence, the results of these two studies are potentially subject to 
self-selection and generalizability issues. Moreover, both studies compute pay ratio as the ratio 
of CEO pay to total compensation expense less the compensation of the five highest-paid 
executives scaled by the total number of employees. This construct runs the risk of understating 
the true disparity between CEO pay and the pay of average rank-and-file worker because even 
after subtracting the five highest-paid executives’ compensation, the firm’s total compensation 
expense still includes remuneration of all other highly compensated senior employees. The data 
sources used in this study and the additional complementary analyses of the quality of 
acquisitions and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity makes our inferences more generalizable 
and robust.9 Hence, alongside the extant literature, our study enables a more comprehensive 
understanding of the impact of CEO pay ratio on firm value and performance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses data and summary 
statistics. Section 3 presents results on the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance. Section 4 reports the results on the relationship between CEO pay ratio and 
corporate decisions. Section 5 presents additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1.  Data 
Despite much public interest, empirical research on CEO pay ratios is scarce due to data 
                                                     
9 International studies on pay divergence between senior executives and rank-and-file workers provide conflicting 
results (Shin et al. 2015; Mueller et al. 2017). In any event, it is difficult to generalize international findings to the 
U.S. settings because CEO pay is significantly larger in the U.S. when compared with other industrialized nations 
(e.g., Conyon et al. 2011).   
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constraints. While CEO compensation is disclosed in proxy statements, firms are currently not 
required to report average worker pay. We overcome this problem by using a proprietary dataset 
of firm-level worker pay obtained from PayScale.com, the market leader in global compensation 
data, to calculate CEO pay ratios. PayScale.com owns the largest database of employee salary 
data, with over 54 million salary profiles. PayScale.com primarily gathers compensation data 
directly from the workers. It applies proprietary algorithms to assure the consistency of the data 
and complements its data collected from employees with both publicly and privately available 
data sources to further ensure the accuracy of its data.10 Ensuring data accuracy is critical to 
PayScale.com because its revenue generation model is based on its ability to sell research reports 
on compensation to companies that require such information in setting their own compensation 
practices. Providing inaccurate/skewed compensation data would critically undermine 
PayScale’s business model. PayScale’s position as the leader in compensation data provision 
market attests to the broad integrity of its data.      
We obtained the 2011 firm-level compensation data from PayScale.com, along with the 
permission to use them for research purposes. This data provides a comprehensive snapshot of 
worker salaries for our sample firms. Based on 20 randomly selected firms, we find that the 
average number of employees providing compensation information per firm is 229. The 
relatively large number of employees per firm indicates that the worker pay information 
collected by PayScale.com is likely to be representative. Despite its wide coverage and extensive 
data validation, PayScale.com salary data may not be completely comprehensive or accurate, but 
any random errors in the data should not affect our findings in a systematic manner. Further, 
from an empirical standpoint, what is more critical for us is that our computed CEO pay ratios 
provide a representative picture of relative pay disparity across firms rather than whether they 
depict the precise ratio of CEO to average worker pay at each firm. In other words, the 
                                                     
10 Please see the detailed discussion at the company’s website: http://www.payscale.com/about/methodology 
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possibility that the average worker pay in PayScale.com does not reflect the true average worker 
pay should not be a major concern for us as long as any biases do not systematically differ across 
companies. It is also worth noting that the SEC’s proposed pay ratio disclosure rules allow 
companies to determine the median employee pay using statistical sampling methods, instead of 
gathering data of the entire employee population.   
We combine firm-level average employee pay obtained from PayScale.com with CEO 
compensation data disclosed in proxy statements, as collated by Capital IQ, to calculate the CEO 
pay ratio. To obtain the average employee pay, we start with the compensation data of 10,602 
U.S. companies, non-for-profit organizations, and government entities in the PayScale.com 
database. After merging this list of firms with the Compustat data, 1,590 firms remain. We then 
eliminate 425 firms with no data on GMI Ratings in 2011, 11 with CEO total compensation 
missing from Capital IQ, and 29 with median employee compensation data missing from 
PayScale.com. After dropping those with missing variables for regression analyses, the final 
sample consists of 817 firms for tests of the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance, 105 for tests of the quality of acquisitions, and 994 for tests of CEO-turnover 
performance sensitivity. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
2.2. Calculation of CEO Pay Ratio 
We use two measures to capture the CEO pay ratio. The data provided by PayScale.com 
include firm-level median compensation of employees sorted by experience (i.e., “less than 1 
year,” “1-4 years,” “5-9 years,” “10-19 years,” and “20+ years”). The first CEO pay ratio 
measure, referred to as AverageRatio, is defined as the ratio of CEO total compensation 
(including salary, bonus, stock-based compensation, long-term incentive pay, and deferred 
compensation such as pension) to the average of median employee compensations across all 
experience ranges. This measure is unlikely to be skewed by the presence of a few highly-paid 
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executives in PayScale.com employee data, as PayScale.com reports the median, not the mean, 
compensation at each experience range. The second CEO pay ratio measure, EntryRatio, is 
defined as the ratio of CEO total compensation to the median compensation of employees with 
the least amount of experience. Complementing AverageRatio, this measure captures the 
disparity between CEO pay and that of employees early in their careers. Both ratios are industry-
adjusted and scaled by 100 in the regression analyses to facilitate result interpretation.  
Because CEO compensation and average worker pay are collected from different sources, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that the components included in these two numbers are not 
identical. For example, while CEO total compensation includes deferred compensation such as 
pension, the average worker pay might not. Similarly, CEO total compensation includes CEOs’ 
stock-based compensation, but most average workers do not receive stock-based compensation. 
Also, according to the proposed SEC regulation, the worker compensation used to calculate pay 
ratio includes compensation of domestic as well as foreign workers. In contrast, the worker pay 
collected by PayScale.com only reflects the pay of domestic workers. To address these issues, 
we conduct several sensitivity tests and find that our results are not driven by these factors, as 
discussed later. 
 
2.3.  Summary Statistics  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on the CEO pay ratio and the variables used in the 
analyses of firm value and performance. These statistics are based on the sample of 817 firms 
with non-missing data. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. The average CEO 
compensation in our sample is $7,780,000, while the average employee pay is $74,365 and the 
average entry-level employee pay is $55,214.11    
                                                     
11 The average pay in our sample is greater than the national per capita personal income of $41,560 reported by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. It should be noted that our sample consists of 
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The mean unadjusted AverageRatio (EntryRatio) is 103.2 (145.3), indicating that CEO 
compensation is 103 times (145 times) that of the average (entry) worker. These numbers are 
broadly consistent with the findings of a recent survey by the consulting firm Mercer that 
average CEO pay ratio is less than 200 for majority of firms.12,13 To ensure that our results are 
not influenced by the variations in compensation practices across industries, in all regression 
analyses both AverageRatio and EntryRatio are industry-adjusted by subtracting the two-digit 
SIC industry median AverageRatio and EntryRatio from the firm ratios, respectively.14  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3. CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Value and Performance 
As previously noted, the nature of the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance, if any, is not clear ex-ante. As per fair wage-effort theory (Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990), large disparity between executive pay and worker pay leads to perceptions of 
unfairness among workers and induce them to withdraw effort, implying a negative association 
between CEO pay ratios and firm value/performance. A similar observation would be expected if 
high CEO pay ratios are outcomes of governance failures, where the CEO is able to extract rents. 
This latter conjecture is based on the premise that CEOs are more capable of engaging in rent 
seeking behavior and getting overpaid when compared with rank-and-file workers and the large 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
employees in large listed corporations while the national statistics cover a much broader range of workers that 
include employees in state, not-for-profit, and agricultural sectors, along with self-employed individuals.  
12 http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015; http://www.mercer.com/newsroom/ceo-to-employee-
pay-ratios-lower-than-expected-new-mercer-survey-finds.html. Mercer did not report precise CEO pay ratio 
numbers.  Respondents were only asked to estimate their company’s pay ratio within bands (e.g. less than 100, 100 
to 200, 200 to 300 etc.).  
13 Our numbers are lower than the oft-cited CEO pay ratio of over 300 reported by the trade union conglomerate 
AFL-CIO. However, as argued by Perry and Saltsman (2014), the AFL-CIO pay ratios are greatly inflated because 
they are based on CEO pay of a small sample of large multinational firms and the average worker pay of production 
and nonsupervisory workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database at the national level, as opposed to the 
firm level. 
14 Untabulated results show significant industry-level variations in CEO pay ratio. For example, the CEO pay ratio is 
only 91 for utilities, but 191 times for the metal mining industry.    
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body of empirical evidence indicating that governance failures lead to lower firm value and 
poorer performance.15 In contrast, if CEO talent is scarce and high CEO pay ratios capture firms’ 
ability to secure superior CEO talent, we would expect firms with higher CEO pay ratios to 
exhibit higher value and better performance. This argument asserts that CEO talent is more 
scalable than average worker talent and hence incremental CEO talent commands 
disproportionately greater rewards than incremental worker talent (Gabaix and Landier 2008; 
Terviö 2008). It is also possible that CEO pay ratio is not related to firm value/performance at 
all, because some argue that worker pay and CEO pay reflect entirely different labor markets and 
hence the pay ratio should not provide any economic insights.   
As in any empirical study, however, extreme caution should be exercised in order to make 
strong inferences. It is possible that certain firm characteristics that give rise to particularly high 
or low CEO pay ratios may also be associated with high or low firm value/performance. For 
example, the CEO pay ratio in a particular industry may be systematically different from other 
industries, due to the nature of its workforce. Firm value/performance may also vary similarly 
across industries, and any systematic relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance will be reflective of industry-level differences rather than the earlier outlined 
theories. We employ a number of strategies to address this omitted correlated variable issue. 
First, we industry-adjust our measures of CEO pay ratios and firm value/performance so that the 
results cannot be attributed to industry effects. Second, to address the concern with reverse 
causality, we investigate the relationship between CEO pay ratio and future (i.e., one-year-ahead) 
firm value/performance after controlling for contemporaneous firm value and performance.16 In 
the regression models, we therefore examine whether the current period CEO pay ratio explains 
the next period firm value/performance over and above the effect of the current period firm value 
                                                     
15 See Yermack (1996), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Cremers and 
Nair (2005), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), and Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) for examples.  
16 Controlling for additional lagged firm value/performance leads to the same inferences.  
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and performance. Third, we subsequently test the relationship between CEO pay ratio and the 
outcomes of two key corporate decisions, the quality of acquisitions and CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. Documenting consistent results from these latter tests would greatly 
enhance the credibility of our main inferences. These research design choices and empirical 
investigations along multiple dimensions should mitigate endogeneity concerns to a great extent. 
 
3.1. CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Value 
We use the following regression model to estimate the relationship between CEO pay ratio 
and firm value: 
ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏ ݍ௧ାଵ =  ߙ +  ߚଵܥܧܱ ݌ܽݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋௧ + ߚଶܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏ ݍ௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௧ + ߚ௞ܱݐℎ݁ݎ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ +
ߝ௧ାଵ          (1) 
We follow prior research and use Tobin’s q to capture firm value (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1988; Lang and Stulz 1994; Yermack 1996; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011). As indicated previously, Tobin’s q and CEO pay ratio are 
industry-adjusted. The coefficient of interest is that on CEO pay ratio (β1). We control for lagged 
Tobin’s q and accounting performance measured in terms of ROA (both industry-adjusted). 
Following prior research on executive compensation, we also control for variables including 
CEO pay slice (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011);17 a composite measure of governance 
(governance index) comprising of the number of large shareholders, the number of large 
shareholders on board, board size, and board independence (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001);18 
insider ownership and squared insider ownership (McConnell and Servaes 1990); firm size; 
leverage (McConnell and Servaes 1995); the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets; an 
                                                     
17 Bebchuk et al. (2011) show that CEO pay slice (the fraction of aggregate top executive compensation captured by 
the CEO) is negatively related to firm value and performance. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between CEO 
pay slice and our two measures of CEO pay ratio varies between 0.385 and 0.405 (0.489 and 0.506). None of our 
results are sensitive to the exclusion of this control variable.  
18 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the construction of the governance index.  
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indicator variable for missing R&D amounts (Shin and Stulz 2000; Koh and Reeb 2015); the 
ratio of capital expenditure to assets; firm age (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011); business 
segment concentration measured as the firm-level Herfindahl index based on segment sales; and 
market share based on industry-level sales (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012; Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt 1988).19 Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
Table 3 reports the regression results. CEO pay ratio is positively correlated with the next-
period’s Tobin’s q irrespective of whether it is measured as AverageRatio or EntryRatio (t = 2.66 
and 2.52, respectively). The effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
significant. A one-standard deviation increase in AverageRatio (EntryRatio) is associated with a 
0.037 (0.033) increase in one-year-ahead industry-adjusted Tobin’s q.20 Given the sample mean 
one-year-ahead (industry-unadjusted) Tobin’s q of 1.731, this represents a relative increase of 
2.1 percent (1.9 percent). These findings indicate that firms with higher CEO pay ratios exhibit 
higher values in the subsequent period, consistent with the CEO ability view of the CEO pay 
ratio. 
The results on control variables are largely consistent with previous studies, such as 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). We find that one-year-ahead industry-adjusted Tobin’s q 
decreases with CEO pay slice and the squared insider ownership, and increases with lagged 
Tobin’s q, insider ownership and leverage. Regressions appear quite well specified with adjusted 
r-squared of over 80 percent.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.2.  CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Performance 
                                                     
19 Our tests on firm value and firm performance do not include industry fixed effects because both the dependent 
variable and the variable of interest are industry adjusted. However, incorporating industry fixed effects does not 
alter our inferences.  
20 The standard deviations of industry-adjusted AverageRatio and EntryRatio are 0.790 and 1.252 respectively (not 
tabulated). Therefore, the effect of AverageRatio is calculated as 0.79 × 0.047 and that of EntryRatio as 1.252 × 
0.026. 
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We use the following regression model to estimate the relationship between CEO pay ratio 
and firm performance: 
ܴܱܣ௧ାଵ =  ߙ +  ߚଵܥܧܱ ݌ܽݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋௧ + ߚଶܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏ ݍ௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௧ + ߚ௞ܱݐℎ݁ݎ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ + ߝ௧ାଵ
 (2) 
Model (2) is identical to Model (1) except that the dependent variable is one-year-ahead 
industry-adjusted ROA, which is our measure of firm performance.  
Table 4 reports the regression results. We find that CEO pay ratio is significantly positively 
correlated with one-year-ahead ROA whether CEO pay ratio is measured as AverageRatio or 
EntryRatio (t = 2.62 and 3.05, respectively). In terms of economic significance, a one-standard 
deviation increase in AverageRatio (EntryRatio) is associated with a 0.553 (0.626) percentage 
point increase in one-year-ahead ROA.21 Given that the sample average ROA is 4.3 percent, this 
represents a relative increase of 13 (15) percent. These findings are consistent with the earlier 
results on firm value and can partly explain why firms with higher pay ratios command higher 
values.   
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
The combined results on the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance lend credence to the view that firms with higher pay ratios employ more 
capable CEOs. These findings are inconsistent with the views that deteriorating employee morale 
due to high pay dispersion leads to discernible declines in firm value/performance and that high 
CEO pay ratios reflect governance failures/CEO rent extraction.   
 
4. CEO Pay Ratio and Corporate Outcomes 
In this section, we investigate whether CEO pay ratio is associated with value creation 
through acquisitions and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The objectives of the 
                                                     
21 The effect of AverageRatio is calculated as 0.79 × 0.007 and that of EntryRatio as 1.252 × 0.005. 
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investigation are three-fold. First, investigating these corporate outcomes, which are closely 
related to the CEO, enables us to make stronger inferences. Second, this investigation will enable 
us to further distinguish between the alternative views on high pay ratios: governance failure vs. 
CEO ability. Third, if these additional analyses provide consistent results, they will alleviate any 
remaining concerns that our previous findings on CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance are 
driven by omitted correlated variables. 
4.1. CEO Pay Ratio and Value Creation through Acquisitions 
Acquisitions are important corporate investment decisions, and CEOs are the main decision 
makers (e.g., Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Malmendiera and Tate 2008; Yim 2013). Hence, the 
quality of acquisitions reflects their ability and incentives. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) 
find that more talented CEOs make better acquisition decisions. On the other hand, CEOs of 
poorly governed firms may use acquisitions for self-serving, empire-building purposes and 
destroy shareholder value (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007).  
The predictions on the link between CEO pay ratio and the propensity to make value-
creating acquisitions depend on the reasoning behind high CEO pay ratios. If in general they are 
symptomatic of governance failures and CEO rent extraction, given the empire-building 
propensities of entrenched managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976), we would expect a 
negative relationship between CEO pay ratio and the quality of acquisitions. However, if firms 
with higher CEO pay ratios indeed have more capable CEOs, we would expect a positive 
association between CEO pay ratio and the quality of acquisitions. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Bebchuk, Cremers, and 
Peyer 2011), we use abnormal stock returns surrounding acquisition announcements to capture 
the quality of acquisitions and estimate the following regression model to investigate this issue:  
ܥܣܴ =  ߙ +  ߚଵܥܧܱ ݌ܽݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋ + ߚ௞ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ + ε  (3) 
For this analysis, we focus on firms with acquisitions in the following year, and this 
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requirement restricts the sample to 105 observations.22 The dependent variable is the acquirers’ 
3-day ([-1, +1]) cumulative abnormal return surrounding the acquisition announcement (CAR). 
The mean (median) CAR [-1,+1] for the sample is 0.010 (0.005) with a standard deviation of 
0.055. The variable of interest is CEO pay ratio. If firms with high CEO pay ratios are more 
likely to make value-creating acquisitions, we expect the coefficient on CEO pay ratio to be 
positive, and the opposite if high CEO pay ratios are indicative of CEO rent extraction.  
We follow Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) to control for acquirer characteristics 
including CEO pay slice, the governance index, firm size, Tobin’s q, ROA, leverage, the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total assets, a binary variable for missing R&D expenditure, the ratio of 
capital expenditure to assets, firm age, business segment concentration, market share, and the 
compounded annual stock return in the year before the acquisition. We control for the relative 
deal size measured as the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s beginning-of-month market 
value of equity and binary variables indicating whether the target is a public or private company 
and whether it is a subsidiary. We also control for industry fixed effects.  
Table 5 reports the regression results. The coefficient on CEO pay ratio is significantly 
positive whether pay ratio is measured as AverageRatio or EntryRatio (t = 2.02 and 2.59, 
respectively). CEOs of firms with higher CEO pay ratios are therefore more likely to make 
value-creating acquisition decisions. This finding is consistent with the notion that, on average, 
CEOs of firms with high CEO pay ratios make better acquisition decisions, corroborating our 
earlier findings that CEO pay ratio is positively associated with firm value and performance. If 
the previously observed positive associations between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance are driven by omitted correlated variables, it is unlikely that we would 
                                                     
22 Acquisition data is obtained from the SDC Platinum database. To ensure that we only focus on acquisitions that 
are economically meaningful, where direct CEO involvement is likely, we limit our analyses to acquisitions where 
the transaction value is at least five percent of the acquirer’s market value of equity. We also remove the 
observations with CEO turnover from year t to year t+1 to ensure that the acquisition decision is made by the same 
CEO reflected in our pay ratio measure.  
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observe a positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and the quality of acquisitions. 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.2. CEO Pay Ratio and Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
Next, we investigate the relationship between CEO pay ratio and CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity to further corroborate our inference that on average higher CEO pay 
ratios appear to reflect firms’ ability to secure scarce CEO talent rather than governance failures. 
The ability to replace poorly-performing CEOs indicates the efficacy of firms’ corporate 
governance (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988). Prior research finds 
that when corporate governance is weak, CEOs are less likely to be replaced following poor 
performance, leading to lower turnover-performance sensitivity (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Denis, 
Denis, and Sarin 1997). Accordingly, if high CEO pay ratios are associated with governance 
failures and CEO rent extraction, then CEO turnover-performance sensitivity will decrease with 
pay ratio.  
We estimate the following regression model to examine this issue:  
ܲݎ(ܥܧܱ ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௧ାଵ = 1) =  ߙ + ߚଵܴܧ ௧ܶ +  ߚଶܥܧܱ ݌ܽݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋௧ + ߚଷܴܧ ௧ܶ×
ܥܧܱ ݌ܽݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋௧ + ߚ௞ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ + ߝ௧ାଵ         (4) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the firm appoints a new CEO in the 
following year and zero otherwise. In our sample we find 80 instances of CEO turnover. 
Turnover-performance sensitivity is captured by the correlation between the current period 
cumulative stock return (RET) and the likelihood of CEO turnover in the next period. 
Accordingly, the coefficient on RET (β1) is expected to be negative. If the turnover-performance 
sensitivity is decreasing (increasing) with CEO pay ratio, we would expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term RET × CEO pay ratio (β3) to be positive (negative).  
Following prior research, we control for CEO pay slice, the fraction of board members 
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appointed after the CEO assumed office (Board Co-option), the percentage of shares owned by 
the CEO (CEO ownership), and an indicator variable for whether the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board (CEO/Chair duality), along with their interactions with RET. These factors have 
been found to be associated with CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (e.g., Bebchuk, Cremer, 
and Peyer 2011; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2014). Following Bebchuk, Cremer, and Peyer 
(2011) we include an indicator variable for whether the CEO is over 60 years old (CEO Age ≥ 
60), and indicator variables for different levels of CEO tenure.23 We also control for industry 
fixed effects.  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the logit regression results with AverageRatio and 
EntryRatio as the measures of CEO pay ratio, respectively. We find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term RET × CEO pay ratio is significantly negative in both columns (t = -2.78 and -
2.67, respectively). That is, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is higher for firms with higher 
CEO pay ratios. These results are inconsistent with the argument that high CEO pay ratios reflect 
governance failures.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
To investigate whether the relationship between CEO pay ratio and turnover-performance 
sensitivity is driven by factors beyond CEOs’ control (Jenter and Kanaan 2015), we split the 
stock return into firm-specific returns (Firm-specific RET) and market returns (Market RET), and 
replace RET in Equation (4) with these two variables. We capture firm specific returns as the 
difference between the realized firm return and the estimated return for the firm based on the 
market model. The betas are estimated from the market model over a 60-month period prior to 
the fiscal year end. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the results. The coefficient on the 
interaction term Firm-specific RET × CEO pay ratio is significantly negative (t = -3.31 and -
                                                     
23 Specifically, we follow Bebchuk, Cremer, and Peyer (2011) and include dummy variables to indicate whether 
CEO tenure is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or greater than 6 years. 
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3.21, respectively), but that on Market RET × CEO pay ratio is statistically insignificant. That is, 
the relationship between CEO pay ratio and turnover-performance sensitivity applies to firm-
specific returns, over which the CEO has more control, but not to market returns, which are 
beyond the CEO’s control.24 
In sum, the results reported in this section reject the notion that high CEO pay ratios result 
from governance failure. Instead they further strengthen our previous inferences that higher CEO 
pay ratios are indicative of firms’ success in attracting scarce CEO talent, which enhances firm 
value and improves performance.   
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1. Pay-for-luck and the Effect of Corporate Governance 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that when rent-seeking CEOs capture the pay-
setting process, higher firm value and performance result in disproportionately higher CEO pay 
even when they do not contribute to the favorable outcomes. Consistent with their argument, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that CEO pay is as sensitive to the results of macro 
factors that are beyond CEOs’ control as it is to the factors that are within their control. They 
refer to this phenomenon as “pay-for-luck,” and find it is more pronounced in firms with weak 
governance.  
The pay-for-luck phenomenon is unlikely to explain our findings for two reasons. First, 
because our measures of firm value and performance are industry adjusted, they are less likely to 
reflect common, external factors. Second, since we investigate the relationship between CEO pay 
ratio and the one-year-ahead, not the contemporaneous, firm value/performance and also control 
                                                     
24 To ensure that our results on turnover-performance sensitivity are not confounded by well-performing firms, in an 
untabulated additional analysis we separate good from bad performers by the median contemporaneous industry-
adjusted Tobin’s q or ROA. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term RET × CEO pay ratio is 
significantly negative for bad performers (i.e., firms with Tobin’s q or ROA below the sample median), but not for 
good performers (i.e., those with Tobin’s q or ROA above the sample median). 
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for the contemporaneous firm value and performance in the analyses; if the pay-for-luck 
argument could explain our results, the CEOs must be able to anticipate changes in future firm 
value/performance and effectively incorporate them into their current year’s compensation 
packages. This is rather unlikely, especially in the case of firm value, because changes in stock 
prices are difficult to anticipate. Nonetheless, to further rule out the pay-for-luck alternative 
explanation, we examine whether our earlier findings on firm value/performance are affected by 
corporate governance in a predictable manner. Because the pay-for-luck phenomenon is more 
pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance, if it drives our results, we would expect 
the positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance to be more 
pronounced for these firms than for others. We test this prediction by adding the interaction term 
of Governance Index with CEO pay ratio to Models (1) and (2). If our earlier findings are driven 
by the pay-for-luck phenomenon, we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term 
CEO pay ratio × Governance Index. 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we construct the Governance Index using 
four governance variables: the number of blockholders, the number of blockholders on the board, 
(negative value of) board size, and board independence. A blockholder is defined as a 
shareholder who owns at least five percent of the common shares in the company. Shareholder 
ownership is collected from Capital IQ. Board size is the number of directors on the board. 
Board Independence is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Board directors’ 
ownership, board size, and the classification of independent directors are obtained from GMI 
Ratings. Governance Index is the unweighted sum of the four standardized governance variables. 
Specifically, we form the index by demeaning each of the four variables, dividing them by their 
respective standard deviations, and then taking the sum of the four standardized variables. 
Higher values of Governance Index indicate stronger governance. Appendix B presents summary 
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statistics on the governance variables used to construct Governance Index.25  
Table 7 reports the regression results. The first two columns report results with Tobin’s q as 
the dependent variable and the last two report those with ROA as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient on the interaction term between CEO pay ratio and Governance index is not 
statistically negative in any of the specifications. In fact, this coefficient is positive and 
marginally significant in the first column of Table 7 (t = 1.73), suggesting that the positive 
relationship between CEO pay ratio and one-year-ahead Tobin’s q is stronger for better governed 
firms.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In sum, the results reported in this section indicate that the positive relationship between 
CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance is not driven by the pay-for-luck phenomenon.    
 
5.2.  Controlling for CEO and Employee Compensation Levels and CEO Compensation 
Structure 
One could argue that our findings may merely be a CEO pay effect rather than a pay ratio 
effect. However, no previous research lends strong support to this argument. For instance, Core, 
Haulthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that CEOs are able to extract additional compensation 
from the firm when corporate governance is weak and that the excess compensation is negatively 
associated with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Similarly, one could 
argue that employee pay levels, rather than the ratio of CEO to employee pay, drive our results. 
To address these concerns, we reexamine the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance after controlling for both the level of CEO compensation (Ln(CEOComp)) 
and the level of employee compensation (Ln(EmployeeComp)) at the average as well as entry 
                                                     
25 The sample used to construct the index includes all of the 1,165 firms that are covered in GMI Ratings in fiscal 
year 2011. The calculation of Governance Index is based on an unbalanced panel and therefore its mean is not zero. 
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level.26  
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results on the relationship between pay ratio and future 
Tobin’s q and ROA with the inclusion of these additional controls. As before, the coefficient on 
CEO pay ratio remains significantly positive whether measured as AverageRatio or EntryRatio, 
so that the positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and future firm value/performance is 
robust to controlling for CEO and employee compensation levels. Interestingly, we find a 
positive association between Ln(CEOComp) and Tobin’s q, but the association between 
Ln(CEOComp) and ROA is insignificant. We do not find employee compensation levels to be 
significantly associated with either Tobin’s q or ROA.27  
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
Our results may also be driven by the variation in CEO stock-based compensation, as 
CEOs with more stock-based compensation are paid extra risk premiums due to the risk they 
bear, leading to higher total compensation. This leads to a higher CEO pay ratio in firms with 
higher CEO stock-based compensation. Further, the incentives of these CEOs are better aligned 
with those of shareholders and they work harder, leading to higher firm value and performance 
(Hanlon et al. 2003). While others argue that stock-based compensation is not correlated with 
firm value in equilibrium (Larcker 2003), we address this issue by directly controlling for the 
structure of CEO compensation. Specifically, we add the CEO stock-based compensation to total 
compensation ratio to the regression as an additional control variable. As reported in Panel B of 
Table 8, our inferences remain the same: the coefficient on CEO pay ratio remains positive with 
                                                     
26 We do not include these variables in our main analyses due to concerns of multicolinearity. The Pearson 
correlation between Ln(CEOComp) and AverageRatio is 0.626. The Pearson correlation between Ln(CEOComp) 
and EntryRatio is 0.596. The Pearson correlation between Ln(EmployeeComp) (Average) and AverageRatio is -
0.048. The corresponding figure for Ln(EmployeeComp) (Entry) and EntryRatio is -0.232. In addition, we do not 
have strong reasons to believe that the level of CEO or worker pay affects future firm value/performance.  
27 Relatedly, one may argue that CEO pay ratio somehow captures a non-linear dimension of the relationship 
between CEO pay and firm value/performance that does not get purged by controlling for CEO pay level. While it is 
impossible to completely rule out this argument, it still asserts that CEO pay ratio is an economically insightful 
construct. 
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both Tobin’s q and ROA as dependent variables.  
 
5.3. Calculation of CEO Pay Ratio 
Because CEO compensation and average worker pay data are gathered from different 
sources, it is possible that the compensation components included in these two variables are 
different. To ensure that our results are not driven by these differences, we conduct a number of 
sensitivity tests. Our inferences remain the same. For brevity, we do not tabulate these sensitivity 
tests.  
First, while total CEO compensation used to measure pay ratio include deferred 
compensation components such as pensions, it is unlikely that employees take deferred 
compensation into account when reporting their pay to PayScale.com. In order to assess whether 
our results are driven by this potential difference between CEO pay and worker pay, we re-run 
our tests by excluding deferred compensation from CEO pay. Untabulated tests indicate that our 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of deferred compensation in CEO pay.  
Second, we test whether our results are sensitive to employees not reporting or 
underestimating their stock-based compensation. While stock-based compensation is not a 
significant component of rank-and-file employee compensation in many industries, this may not 
be the case for firms in high-tech industries. Therefore, in a robustness test we remove high-tech 
firms from our sample and re-run the tests. Our results continue to hold, indicating that the 
potential underestimation or exclusion of employees’ stock-based compensation is unlikely to 
drive our results. In addition, as discussed above, explicitly controlling for CEO stock-based 
compensation in the analyses leads to the same inferences. 
Third, according to the SEC regulation, the worker compensation used to measure pay 
ratio includes compensation of both domestic and foreign workers. However, the worker pay 
collected by PayScale.com and used in this paper only reflects domestic worker pay. Therefore, 
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for firms with significant foreign operations and thus significant number of foreign workers, our 
pay ratio measure likely differs from the SEC pay ratio. To ensure that our results are not driven 
by firms with significant foreign operations, we exclude firms in the top quintile of the ratio of 
foreign income to domestic income and then re-run our tests. Our results continue to hold 
(untabulated), suggesting that they are not driven by firms with significant foreign operations. 
 
5.4. Potential Non-linearity 
Consistent with the CEO ability view, our primary results indicate a positive association 
between pay ratio and firm value/performance. However, this relationship need not be linear. We 
explore the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance by adding the squared term of CEO Pay Ratio to Equations (1) and (2) and 
report the results in Table 9.  
In Table 9, the first two columns use Tobin’s q as the dependent variable and the last two 
columns ROA. We find that the coefficient on the squared term, CEO pay ratio2, is negative in 
all four columns, suggesting that the relationship between pay ratio and firm value/performance 
is concave, although the coefficient is statistically significant only with ROA as the dependent 
variable. That is, firm performance appears to improve with CEO pay ratio at a decreasing rate.28   
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
          
5.5. Pay Ratio Measured with Top Officers Other than the CEO 
The debate on whether executives are paid excessively compared to workers has so far 
focused on the ratio of CEO to average worker pay, but the arguments concerning CEO pay 
ratios also apply to those of senior executives. For example, senior executive talent in general 
                                                     
28 While the association between pay ratio and industry-adjusted ROA is concave, untabulated analyses indicate that 
this relationship becomes negative only when the values AverageRatio and EntryRatio are above the 99th percentile 
of the sample distribution. 
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should be more scalable than worker talent and hence incremental ability at senior executive 
level should command disproportionately larger wage increases than incremental ability at 
worker level does. If so, the positive association observed between CEO pay ratio and firm 
value/performance should also be observed when CEO pay ratio is replaced with the ratio of 
senior executive pay to worker pay. Therefore, to further strengthen our earlier findings, we 
investigate the relationship between the ratio of senior executive pay to worker pay and firm 
value/performance. For this purpose, we define senior executive pay ratio as the total 
compensation of the four highest paid executives other than the CEO over the average worker’s 
pay (Top 4 Pay Ratio). We measure AverageRatio and EntryRatio along the lines previously 
discussed.     
Table 10 report the regression results. As conjectured, we find that Top 4 Pay Ratio is 
positively associated with Tobin’s q and ROA irrespective of whether the ratio is measured as 
AverageRatio or EntryRatio. These findings suggest that our results extend beyond CEO pay 
ratio and can be generalizable to the pay ratio between other top senior executives and the 
average worker.      
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
There is intense public debate over the causes and consequences of wide and seemingly 
growing disparity between the pay of senior executives such as CEOs and rank-file-workers. Our 
paper attempts to inform this debate by examining whether CEO pay ratios are associated with 
firm-level economic outcomes. High CEO pay ratios could result in lower firm values and poor 
operating performances because they can lead to perceptions of unfairness among workers, 
which might in turn cause them to expend less effort and withdraw from work. A similar 
association is also expected if high pay ratios reflect corporate governance failures where CEOs 
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are overcompensated. On the other hand, greater scalability of CEO talent (when compared with 
rank-and-file workers) suggests that incremental CEO ability would receive disproportionately 
higher incremental compensation than incremental rank-and-file worker ability does. If so, 
higher CEO pay ratios would signal firms’ success at hiring more capable CEOs. Per this 
argument, CEO pay ratios should be positively associated with firm value/performance.   
Conducting empirical research on CEO pay ratio is challenging because firms are currently 
not required to disclose average worker pay. While the recent SEC rule requires firms to disclose 
the CEO to average worker pay ratio, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether it would be 
enforced. We overcome this data issue by using a proprietary dataset that contains reliable 
information on firm level average worker pay.    
Consistent with the notion that high CEO pay ratios reflect firms’ ability to secure scarce 
CEO talent, we find that industry-adjusted CEO pay ratio is positively associated with one-year-
ahead firm value and performance. Corroborating these results, we also find that firms with high 
CEO pay ratios are more likely to make value-enhancing acquisitions and have higher CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity. Inconsistent with the pay-for-luck phenomenon, we do not find 
the positive relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance to be stronger for 
firms with weak governance. Our results are robust to controlling for CEO and worker pay levels 
and CEO pay structure, suggesting that our findings on CEO pay ratio are incremental to the 
effects of pay levels and structure. Additional tests also reveal that the relationship between CEO 
pay ratio and firm performance is concave. Finally, we show that the positive association 
between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance can be extended to the ratio of other top 
senior executive pay to average worker pay.  
Overall, our results suggest that the demoralizing effects (if any) of high pay disparity 
between senior executives and workers are not sufficiently large enough to harm the overall firm 
value/performance. Our results also suggest that, on average, high pay ratios are not symptomatic 
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of corporate governance failures and CEO rent extractions. Instead, the results are consistent 
with the argument that high CEO pay ratios are an outcome of market competition for scarce 
CEO talent. It is important to note that our findings do not suggest that high CEO pay ratios 
cause higher firm values and/or superior performance. Rather, they are in line with the argument 
that firms obtaining scarce CEO talent leads to greater disparities between CEO and average 
worker pay. These findings provide useful insights to policy makers and the public who are keen 
to understand the reasons behind high CEO pay ratios.  
While our findings dispel the notion that high CEO pay ratios result in deteriorations in the 
overall firm value/performance, it is worth noting that our sample is purely cross-sectional. 
Hence, we are unable to investigate the effects of within-firm time series changes in the pay gap 
between senior executives and average workers.29 We also note that our study focuses on 
economic aspects of pay disparity between senior executives and average workers and does not 
allude to broader social norms such as fairness and social equity. These unresolved issues leave 
room for fruitful future research.  
    
                                                     
29 Conventional wisdom seems to suggest that intra-firm pay dispersion has been increasing over time. However, 
some recent studies question this notion and attribute rising income inequality over the past few decades to inter-
firm rather than intra-firm increases in pay dispersion (Song et al. 2015; Barth et al. 2016). 
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APPENDIX A Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. In the regression analysis, we 
use industry adjusted measures by subtracting the four-digit SIC industry median 
Tobin’s q of all Compustat firms from the firm Tobin’s q. 
ROA ROA is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
total assets. In the regression analysis, we use industry adjusted measures by subtracting 
the four-digit SIC industry median ROA of all Compustat firms from the firm ROA. 
CEO pay ratio 
(AverageRatio) 
CEO-to-employee total compensation ratio, measured as CEO’s total compensation 
(data source: Capital IQ) / average of median employee compensations across 
experience categories (data source: PayScale.com). The experience categories where 
median salaries are reported by PayScale.com are; “less than 1 year,” “1-4 years,” “5-9 
years,” “10-19 years,” “20+ years.” In the regression analyses, we use industry-adjusted 
measures by subtracting the two-digit SIC industry median AverageRatio from the firm 
ratio, and then dividing the difference by 100. 
CEO pay ratio 
(EntryRatio) 
CEO to entry-level employee total compensation ratio, measured as CEO’s total 
compensation (data source: Capital IQ)/median compensation for employees with least 
amount of experience (data source: PayScale.com). In the regression analyses, we use 
industry-adjusted measures by subtracting the two-digit SIC industry median EntryRatio 
from the firm ratio, and then dividing the difference by 100. 
Top 4 pay ratio 
(AverageRatio) 
Non-CEO Top 4 executives’ total compensation ratio, measured as [Top 5 executives’ 
total compensation – CEO’s total compensation] (data source: Capital IQ)/average of 
median employee compensations across experience categories (data source: 
PayScale.com). In the regression analyses, we use industry-adjusted measures by 
subtracting the two-digit SIC industry median AverageRatio from the firm ratio, and 
then dividing the difference by 100. 
Top 4 pay ratio 
(EntryRatio) 
Non-CEO Top 4 executives to entry-level employee total compensation ratio, measured 
as [Top 5 executives’ total compensation – CEO’s total compensation] (data source: 
Capital IQ) /median compensation for employees with least amount of experience (data 
source: PayScale.com). In the regression analyses, we use industry-adjusted measures 
by subtracting the two-digit SIC industry median EntryRatio from the firm ratio, and 
then dividing the difference by 100. 
Ln(CEOComp) The natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (data source: Capital IQ). 
CEO Pay Slice The ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of the top five executives’ total 
compensation (data source: Capital IQ). 
Governance Index The unweighted sum of the four standardized governance variables: the number of 
blockholders, the number of blockholders on the board, negative of board size, and the 
fraction of fully independent directors. A blockholder is a shareholder that owns more 
than five percent of the common shares in the company. Board size is the number of 
members of board directors. To standardize the measures, we demean each of the four 
variables and divide by their respective standard deviations. Governance Index is 
constructed based on Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
Insider Ownership The Estimated percentage of outstanding shares held by top management and directors 
as reported by GMI Ratings. 
Ln(Sales) The natural logarithm of sales. 
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Leverage The long-term debt to total asset ratio.  
R&D R&D expenses divided by total assets. If R&D is missing, it is set to zero. 
R&D Missing An indicator variable equal to one if R&D is missing, and zero otherwise. 
Capital Expenditure Capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
Firm Age The natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been listed on Compustat at 
the end of fiscal year 2011. 
Business Segment 
Concentration 
Firm-level segement Herfindahl index based on segment sales. Specifically, the ratio of 
ratio of individual business segment sales to total sales is squared and summed across 
all business segments for the fiscal year. If the firm is not in the segment file, it is 
assigned a concentration of one. 
Sales Market Share The percentage of sales earned by the firm within its Fama and French (1997) industry 
at the fiscal year. 
CAR [-1, +1] The cumulative abnormal announcement return of the bidder in the [-1, +1] day window 
around the acquisition announcement. 
Relative Deal Size The ratio of the takeover deal value (from SDC) to the market value of equity of the 
bidder at the beginning of the takeover month.  
Prior RET The compounded stock return in one year before the takeover. 
Public (Target) An indicator variable equal to one if the target of the takeover is a public company, and 
zero otherwise.  
Subsidiary (Target) An indicator variable equal to one if the target of the takeover is a subsidiary, and zero 
otherwise. 
CEO Turnover An indicator equal to one if the CEO of the firm in fiscal year 2012 is not the same as 
that in year 2011, and zero otherwise. 
RET RET is the compounded stock return in fiscal year 2011. 
Firm-Specific RET The cumulative market-model residual return in fiscal year 2011. The betas are 
estimated from the market model over a 60-month period prior to the fiscal year end.  
Market RET The cumulative value-weighted market return in fiscal year 2011.  
Board Co-option The number of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office (“co-opted” directors) 
divided by the board size. 
CEO/Chair Duality An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise. 
CEO Ownership The percentage of outstanding shares held by the CEO. 
CEO Age ≥ 60 An indicator equal to one if the CEO’s age is above 60, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B Summary statistics of variables used to construct governance index 
 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we construct the governance index using four governance 
variables: the number of blockholders, the number of blockholders on the board, (negative value of) board 
size, and board independence. A blockholder is defined as a shareholder who owns at least five percent of 
the common shares in the company. Shareholder ownership is collected from Capital IQ. Board size is the 
number of members of the board of directors. Board Independence is the percentage of independent 
directors on the board. Board directors’ ownership, board size, and the percentage of independent 
directors on the board are obtained from GMI Ratings. Governance Index is the unweighted sum of the 
four standardized governance variables. The variables are standardized by demeaning each of the four 
variables and dividing by their respective standard deviations. These are then added to construct the 
governance index. Larger values for governance index capture stronger governance. The sample used to 
construct the index includes the 1,165 sample firms covered in GMI Ratings at fiscal year 2011. The 
calculation of Governance Index is based on unbalanced panel, so its mean is not zero.  
 
 
  
 N mean median std. 
Number of blockholders (All) 1,020 3.335 3.000 1.686 
Number of blockholders on board 1,117 0.239 0.000 0.566 
Board size 1,158 9.544 9.000 2.377 
Board independence 1,157 0.580 0.600 0.211 
Governance Index 989 -0.032 -0.244 2.091 
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TABLE 1 Sample selection procedure 
 
This table presents the sample selection for the analyses in various tables.  
 
 
  
 
Number of 
observations 
Companies, non-for-profit organizations, and governments that are covered by 
PayScale.com (2011) 10,602 
Companies that are available in Compustat 1,590 
Companies that are available in GMI Ratings at fiscal year 2011 1,165 
After dropping companies with missing CEO total compensations in Capital IQ 1,154 
After dropping companies with missing median employee’s compensation data at 
PayScale.com  1,125 
 
After dropping companies with missing data to construct the governance index 965 
The sample after dropping companies with missing financial or governance data 
(Tables 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9) 817 
 
After merging the 965 firms with SDC acquisition data, there are 618 acquisition 
announcements in the year following the fiscal-year end of 2011 618 
 
The sample after dropping companies with (1) transactions with the same acquirer 
and target name (i.e., share repurchases and self-tender offers); (2) the ratio of the 
transaction value relative to the market equity value of the bidder at the beginning 
of the announcement month being less than 5%; (3) CEO changes during 2012; 
and (4) missing financial or governance data (Table 5) 105 
 
After dropping companies with missing variables from the 1,125 companies, the 
sample used in regressions in Table 6 987 
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TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on variables for the 817 firms used in the analyses of firm 
value and firm performance. Note that Tobin’s q, ROA, CEO pay ratio measures (AverageRatio and 
EntryRatio) are industry-adjusted in the regression analyses to facilitate across-industry comparison.  
 
 
  
 N Mean Median Std. 
Tobin’s q, t+1 817 1.731 1.411 0.941 
ROA, t+1 817 0.043 0.044 0.078 
CEO Total Compensation, t (in dollars) 817 7,780,000 5,820,000 8,540,000 
Employee pay (Average), t (in dollars) 817 74,365 72,409 24,190 
Employee pay (Entry), t (in dollars) 817 55,214 52,118 18,731 
CEO pay ratio, t (AverageRatio)  817 103.2 78.8 84.2 
CEO pay ratio, t (EntryRatio)  817 145.3 109.1 129.3 
Ln(CEOComp), t 817 15.423 15.577 1.239 
Ln Employee pay (Average), t 817 11.174 11.190 0.267 
Ln Employee pay (Entry), t 817 10.872 10.861 0.290 
CEO Pay Slice, t 817 0.390 0.394 0.115 
Governance Index 817 -0.098 -0.266 2.082 
Insider Ownership 817 0.112 0.032 0.195 
Ln(Sales) 817 7.660 7.824 1.389 
Tobin’s q, t 817 1.722 1.403 0.972 
ROA, t 817 0.052 0.049 0.074 
Leverage 817 0.198 0.166 0.179 
R&D 817 0.023 0.000 0.047 
R&D Missing 817 0.436 0.000 0.496 
Capital Expenditure 817 0.046 0.033 0.045 
Firm Age 817 3.195 3.135 0.654 
Business Segment Concentration 817 0.731 0.934 0.300 
Market Share 817 0.025 0.007 0.049 
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TABLE 3 CEO Pay Ratio and Tobin’s q 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of one-year-ahead industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on CEO pay 
ratio and control variables. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Statistical significance of the 
reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
 
Dependent variable:  Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1 
  (1) (2) 
CEO pay ratio =   AverageRatio EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t  0.047*** 0.026** 
  (2.66) (2.52) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t  0.881*** 0.882*** 
  (29.31) (29.34) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t  -0.064 -0.061 
  (-0.23) (-0.22) 
CEO Pay Slice, t  -0.313** -0.295** 
  (-2.33) (-2.22) 
Governance Index  -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.16) (-0.23) 
Insider Ownership  0.514** 0.519** 
  (2.09) (2.10) 
Insider Ownership2  -0.725** -0.734** 
  (-2.45) (-2.46) 
Ln(Sales)  0.001 0.000 
  (0.13) (0.05) 
Leverage  0.162** 0.164** 
  (2.44) (2.47) 
R&D  -0.738 -0.746 
  (-1.46) (-1.47) 
R&D Missing  -0.019 -0.023 
  (-0.68) (-0.81) 
Capital Expenditure  -0.264 -0.258 
  (-1.02) (-1.00) 
Firm Age  0.035 0.036* 
  (1.61) (1.65) 
Business Segment Concentration  0.018 0.020 
  (0.46) (0.50) 
Market Share  -0.303* -0.257 
  (-1.78) (-1.61) 
Constant  -0.033 -0.038 
  (-0.26) (-0.31) 
N  817 817 
Adj. R2  80.58% 80.55% 
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TABLE 4 CEO Pay Ratio and ROA 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of one-year-ahead industry-adjusted ROA on CEO pay ratio 
and control variables. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Statistical significance of the 
reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable:  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
  (1) (2) 
CEO pay ratio =  AverageRatio EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t  0.007*** 0.005*** 
  (2.62) (3.05) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t  0.014*** 0.014*** 
  (3.21) (3.21) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t  0.671*** 0.671*** 
  (8.62) (8.61) 
CEO Pay Slice, t  -0.022 -0.022 
  (-0.99) (-0.98) 
Governance Index  0.003** 0.003** 
  (2.04) (2.05) 
Insider Ownership  -0.010 -0.008 
  (-0.22) (-0.17) 
Insider Ownership2  -0.020 -0.023 
  (-0.30) (-0.34) 
Ln(Sales)  0.004* 0.004* 
  (1.80) (1.78) 
Leverage  -0.005 -0.004 
  (-0.33) (-0.30) 
R&D  -0.144 -0.144 
  (-1.17) (-1.17) 
R&D Missing  -0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.97) (-1.09) 
Capital Expenditure  -0.149*** -0.147*** 
  (-3.31) (-3.24) 
Firm Age  0.006* 0.006* 
  (1.69) (1.70) 
Business Segment Concentration  0.011 0.012 
  (1.44) (1.49) 
Market Share  -0.032 -0.030 
  (-1.11) (-1.06) 
Constant  -0.039 -0.039* 
  (-1.63) (-1.65) 
N  817 817 
Adj. R2  47.49% 47.55% 
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TABLE 5 CEO Pay Ratio and Returns Surrounding Acquisition Announcements 
 
This table reports OLS regression results on the relationship between CEO pay ratios and abnormal stock 
returns surrounding acquisition announcements. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
announcement return of the bidder in the three days around the announcement (CAR [-1, +1]). Please see 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Statistical significance of the reported coefficients is based on 
Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
  Dependent variable: CAR [-1, +1]   
 (1) (2)  
CEO pay ratio = AverageRatio EntryRatio  
CEO pay ratio (Bidder) 0.049** 0.044**  
(2.02) (2.59)  
CEO Pay Slice (Bidder) -0.134 -0.173**  
 (-1.63) (-2.10)  
Governance Index (Bidder) 0.007 0.008*  
 (1.49) (1.74)  
Ln(Sales) (Bidder) -0.003 -0.003  
 (-0.43) (-0.39)  
Tobin’s q (Bidder) 0.007 0.005  
 (0.57) (0.39)  
ROA (Bidder) -0.297 -0.255  
 (-1.54) (-1.45)  
Leverage (Bidder) -0.024 -0.020  
 (-0.43) (-0.38)  
R&D (Bidder) -0.336 -0.320  
 (-1.61) (-1.49)  
R&D Missing (Bidder) -0.002 -0.001  
 (-0.09) (-0.07)  
Capital Expenditure (Bidder) 0.163 0.127  
 (0.47) (0.37)  
Firm Age (Bidder) -0.005 -0.006  
 (-0.24) (-0.34)  
Business Segment Concentration (Bidder) -0.007 0.003  
(-0.24) (0.11)  
Market Share (Bidder) -0.417 -0.510  
 (-0.88) (-1.10)  
Prior RET (Bidder) 0.034 0.032  
 (0.97) (0.92)  
Relative Deal Size 0.037 0.032  
 (1.35) (1.43)  
Public (Target) -0.023 -0.022  
 (-1.18) (-1.24)  
Subsidiary (Target) -0.019 -0.023  
 (-1.26) (-1.48)  
Constant 0.220* 0.256*  
 (1.70) (1.94)  
Industry indicators (Bidder) Yes Yes  
N 105 105  
Adj. R2 0.11% 4.79%  
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TABLE 6 CEO Pay Ratio and Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
 
This table reports logit regression results on the relationship between CEO pay ratio and CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. The dependent variable CEO Turnover is an indicator that equals one if the CEO 
of the firm in year t+1 is not the same as in year t. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Statistical significance of the reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
CEO pay ratio = 
CEO Turnover, t+1 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
AverageRatio EntryRatio  AverageRatio EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t 0.558** 0.345***  0.558** 0.373** 
 (2.29) (2.59)  (2.15) (2.50) 
RET, t -9.156*** -8.823***    
 (-3.44) (-3.36)    
RET, t × CEO pay ratio, t -1.955*** -1.243***    
 (-2.78) (-2.67)    
RET, t × CEO Pay Slice, t 15.730*** 14.950***    
 (2.68) (2.60)    
RET, t × Board Co-option 14.660** 13.900**    
 (2.57) (2.32)    
RET, t × CEO Ownership -21.720 -24.590    
 (-0.80) (-0.87)    
RET, t × CEO/Chair Duality 0.766 0.922    
 (0.53) (0.64)    
Firm-Specific RET, t    -11.740*** -11.390*** 
    (-3.28) (-3.22) 
Market RET, t    1.602 0.830 
    (0.11) (0.06) 
Firm-Specific RET, t × CEO pay ratio, t    -2.392*** -1.532*** 
   (-3.31) (-3.21) 
Market RET, t × CEO pay ratio, t    -0.484 -0.832 
   (-0.14) (-0.47) 
Firm-Specific RET, t × CEO Pay Slice, t    21.490*** 20.680*** 
    (2.71) (2.65) 
Market RET, t × CEO Pay Slice, t    3.519 5.049 
    (0.13) (0.20) 
Firm-Specific RET, t × Board Co-option    15.910** 15.350** 
    (2.49) (2.32) 
Market RET, t × Board Co-option    -9.204 -9.370 
    (-0.40) (-0.43) 
Firm-Specific RET, t × CEO Ownership    -20.590 -24.740 
    (-0.76) (-0.85) 
Market RET, t × CEO Ownership    -342.300 -361.200 
    (-0.92) (-0.97) 
Firm-Specific RET, t × CEO/Chair Duality    1.020 1.275 
    (0.64) (0.81) 
Market RET, t × CEO/Chair Duality    5.837 6.411* 
    (1.57) (1.77) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -2.010 -1.857  -1.982 -1.945 
 (-0.91) (-0.87)  (-0.85) (-0.85) 
Board Co-option -14.720*** -14.490***  -14.980*** -14.790*** 
 (-6.12) (-6.09)  (-5.69) (-5.66) 
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CEO Ownership -26.950* -27.270*  -24.810* -24.970* 
 (-1.82) (-1.79)  (-1.86) (-1.78) 
CEO/Chair Duality -0.862** -0.885**  -0.913** -0.973** 
 (-2.22) (-2.28)  (-2.20) (-2.33) 
CEO Age ≥ 60 0.961** 0.974**  0.947** 0.957** 
 (2.44) (2.52)  (2.35) (2.42) 
Constant -3.132*** -2.989***  -3.156*** -2.957*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.76)  (-2.66) (-2.59) 
CEO tenure and industry indicators Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 987 987  987 987 
Pseudo R2 57.60% 57.28%  58.75% 58.49% 
 
  
 
  
45 
 
TABLE 7 CEO Pay Ratio, Tobin’s q, and ROA: Conditional on Governance Index 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of Tobin’s q and ROA on CEO pay ratio and control 
variables. The dependent variable is one-year-ahead industry-adjusted Tobin’s q in Columns (1) and (2) 
and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted ROA in Columns (3) and (4). Please see Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Statistical significance of the reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard 
errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
CEO pay ratio = AverageRatio EntryRatio  AverageRatio EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t 0.059*** 0.033**  0.007** 0.005*** 
 (2.74) (2.57)  (2.41) (2.83) 
CEO pay ratio, t × Governance Index 0.016* 0.009  -0.000 0.000 
(1.73) (1.54)  (-0.12) (0.31) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t 0.879*** 0.880***  0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (28.94) (29.07)  (3.20) (3.19) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t -0.059 -0.060  0.671*** 0.671*** 
 (-0.21) (-0.22)  (8.61) (8.61) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -0.361** -0.332**  -0.022 -0.023 
 (-2.56) (-2.39)  (-0.94) (-1.01) 
Governance Index -0.003 -0.004  0.003** 0.003** 
 (-0.42) (-0.48)  (2.03) (1.97) 
Insider Ownership 0.548** 0.549**  -0.010 -0.007 
 (2.23) (2.22)  (-0.23) (-0.15) 
Insider Ownership2 -0.766*** -0.768**  -0.019 -0.024 
 (-2.59) (-2.58)  (-0.29) (-0.36) 
Ln(Sales) 0.002 0.001  0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.22) (0.12)  (1.78) (1.78) 
Leverage 0.160** 0.161**  -0.005 -0.004 
 (2.41) (2.42)  (-0.33) (-0.30) 
R&D -0.703 -0.718  -0.144 -0.143 
 (-1.40) (-1.42)  (-1.17) (-1.16) 
R&D Missing -0.016 -0.020  -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.57) (-0.72)  (-0.97) (-1.07) 
Capital Expenditure -0.245 -0.233  -0.150*** -0.146*** 
 (-0.95) (-0.90)  (-3.32) (-3.23) 
Firm Age 0.037* 0.038*  0.006* 0.006* 
 (1.68) (1.74)  (1.68) (1.71) 
Business Segment Concentration 0.022 0.022  0.011 0.012 
 (0.55) (0.57)  (1.43) (1.49) 
Market Share -0.280 -0.248  -0.032 -0.029 
 (-1.64) (-1.54)  (-1.13) (-1.05) 
Constant -0.027 -0.036  -0.039 -0.039* 
 (-0.22) (-0.29)  (-1.64) (-1.65) 
N 817 817  817 817 
Adj. R2 80.64% 80.59%  47.43% 47.49% 
  
 
  
46 
 
TABLE 8 Controlling for CEO and Employee Compensation Levels and CEO 
Compensation Structure 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of Tobin’s q and ROA on CEO pay ratio and control 
variables after controlling for the level of CEO and employee compensation (Panel A) and the CEO 
compensation structure (Panel B). For each panel, the dependent variable is one-year-ahead industry-
adjusted Tobin’s q in Columns (1) and (2) and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted ROA in Columns (3) and 
(4). For Panel B, the CEO compensation structure is measured as the stock-based compensation ratio (i.e., 
the grant date fair value of stock and option awards, divided by total compensation). Stock-based 
compensation data are collected from Capital IQ. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Statistical significance of the reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Controlling for CEO and employee compensation level 
Dependent Variable: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
 
CEO pay ratio = 
(1) 
AverageRatio 
(2) 
EntryRatio 
 (3) 
AverageRatio 
(4) 
EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t 0.032* 0.020*  0.007** 0.004** 
 (1.70) (1.76)  (2.03) (2.27) 
Ln(CEOComp) 0.024** 0.027**  0.001 0.002 
 (1.97) (2.22)  (0.65) (0.84) 
Ln(EmployeeComp) (Average) 0.076   0.015  
 (1.13)   (1.36)  
Ln(EmployeeComp) (Entry)  0.066   0.005 
  (1.28)   (0.50) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t 0.883*** 0.883***  0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (29.48) (29.47)  (3.29) (3.24) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t -0.079 -0.080  0.669*** 0.670*** 
 (-0.29) (-0.29)  (8.68) (8.64) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -0.383*** -0.391***  -0.026 -0.029 
 (-2.70) (-2.78)  (-1.06) (-1.20) 
Governance Index 0.000 0.000  0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.07) (0.01)  (2.20) (2.18) 
Insider Ownership 0.621** 0.613**  0.003 -0.001 
 (2.45) (2.44)  (0.06) (-0.02) 
Insider Ownership2 -0.830*** -0.821***  -0.033 -0.029 
 (-2.74) (-2.73)  (-0.49) (-0.44) 
Ln(Sales) -0.004 -0.004  0.003 0.004 
 (-0.52) (-0.52)  (1.34) (1.54) 
Leverage 0.147** 0.149**  -0.006 -0.005 
 (2.23) (2.24)  (-0.44) (-0.38) 
R&D -0.913* -0.878  -0.178 -0.153 
 (-1.67) (-1.65)  (-1.33) (-1.19) 
R&D Missing -0.020 -0.020  -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.72) (-0.72)  (-1.02) (-1.04) 
Capital Expenditure -0.284 -0.306  -0.151*** -0.151*** 
 (-1.10) (-1.16)  (-3.30) (-3.30) 
Firm Age 0.035 0.034  0.006* 0.006* 
 (1.57) (1.56)  (1.78) (1.67) 
Business Segment Concentration 0.031 0.029  0.013* 0.012 
 (0.78) (0.73)  (1.69) (1.58) 
Market Share -0.346** -0.339**  -0.039 -0.035 
 (-2.00) (-2.04)  (-1.32) (-1.23) 
Constant -1.187 -1.088*  -0.219** -0.115 
 (-1.60) (-1.91)  (-2.04) (-1.26) 
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N 817 817  817 817 
Adj. R2 80.65% 80.64%  47.55% 47.48% 
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Controlling for CEO compensation structure 
 
Dependent Variable: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
 
CEO pay ratio =  
(1) 
AverageRatio 
(2) 
EntryRatio 
 (3) 
AverageRatio 
(4) 
EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t 0.046** 0.025**  0.008*** 0.005*** 
 (2.53) (2.39)  (2.86) (3.17) 
CEO Stock Compensation Ratio, t 0.017 0.022  -0.017* -0.016* 
 (0.30) (0.38)  (-1.68) (-1.65) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t 0.882*** 0.883***  0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (29.17) (29.20)  (3.20) (3.20) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t -0.085 -0.081  0.670*** 0.671*** 
 (-0.31) (-0.29)  (8.47) (8.46) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -0.312** -0.296**  -0.013 -0.013 
 (-2.30) (-2.19)  (-0.60) (-0.57) 
Governance Index -0.001 -0.002  0.003** 0.003** 
 (-0.17) (-0.24)  (2.07) (2.07) 
Insider Ownership 0.518** 0.526**  -0.020 -0.017 
 (2.16) (2.19)  (-0.43) (-0.38) 
Insider Ownership2 -0.730** -0.740**  -0.011 -0.014 
 (-2.52) (-2.54)  (-0.17) (-0.22) 
Ln(Sales) 0.001 -0.000  0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.07) (-0.02)  (1.88) (1.86) 
Leverage 0.160** 0.161**  -0.004 -0.003 
 (2.40) (2.42)  (-0.25) (-0.22) 
R&D -0.710 -0.722  -0.127 -0.127 
 (-1.38) (-1.40)  (-1.01) (-1.01) 
R&D Missing -0.019 -0.023  -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.68) (-0.80)  (-0.98) (-1.11) 
Capital Expenditure -0.279 -0.273  -0.147*** -0.145*** 
 (-1.07) (-1.05)  (-3.27) (-3.18) 
Firm Age 0.034 0.035  0.006 0.006 
 (1.57) (1.61)  (1.52) (1.54) 
Business Segment Concentration 0.019 0.021  0.011 0.012 
 (0.48) (0.52)  (1.49) (1.53) 
Market Share -0.306* -0.261  -0.032 -0.028 
 (-1.79) (-1.63)  (-1.12) (-1.02) 
Constant -0.034 -0.040  -0.035 -0.036 
 (-0.27) (-0.32)  (-1.52) (-1.54) 
N 812 812  812 812 
Adj. R2 80.55% 80.53%  47.68% 47.72% 
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TABLE 9 CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Value/Performance: The Nonlinearity  
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of Tobin’s q and ROA on CEO pay ratio and control 
variables after including the squared term of CEO pay ratio. The dependent variable is one-year-ahead 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q in Columns (1) and (2) and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted ROA in 
Columns (3) and (4). Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Statistical significance of the 
reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
 
CEO pay ratio = 
(1) 
AverageRatio 
(2) 
EntryRatio 
 (3) 
AverageRatio 
(4) 
EntryRatio 
CEO pay ratio, t 0.065* 0.043*  0.016** 0.011*** 
 (1.80) (1.78)  (2.56) (2.78) 
CEO pay ratio2, t -0.010 -0.004  -0.005* -0.002** 
 (-0.75) (-0.94)  (-1.95) (-2.11) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t 0.880*** 0.881***  0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (29.25) (29.25)  (3.17) (3.16) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t -0.064 -0.061  0.671*** 0.671*** 
 (-0.23) (-0.22)  (8.69) (8.68) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -0.328** -0.317**  -0.029 -0.030 
 (-2.38) (-2.31)  (-1.27) (-1.29) 
Governance Index -0.001 -0.001  0.003** 0.003** 
 (-0.10) (-0.10)  (2.20) (2.27) 
Insider Ownership 0.533** 0.535**  -0.001 -0.002 
 (2.18) (2.18)  (-0.01) (-0.04) 
Insider Ownership2 -0.743** -0.742**  -0.028 -0.026 
 (-2.53) (-2.52)  (-0.42) (-0.38) 
Ln(Sales) 0.002 0.001  0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.20) (0.20)  (1.91) (1.94) 
Leverage 0.162** 0.165**  -0.004 -0.004 
 (2.45) (2.48)  (-0.32) (-0.29) 
R&D -0.735 -0.743  -0.142 -0.143 
 (-1.46) (-1.47)  (-1.17) (-1.17) 
R&D Missing -0.019 -0.023  -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.68) (-0.81)  (-0.97) (-1.10) 
Capital Expenditure -0.248 -0.237  -0.142*** -0.140*** 
 (-0.96) (-0.92)  (-3.17) (-3.10) 
Firm Age 0.034 0.035  0.006 0.006 
 (1.56) (1.59)  (1.57) (1.59) 
Business Segment Concentration 0.020 0.022  0.012 0.012 
 (0.50) (0.56)  (1.54) (1.60) 
Market Share -0.288* -0.279*  -0.025 -0.037 
 (-1.68) (-1.70)  (-0.88) (-1.29) 
Constant -0.030 -0.037  -0.038 -0.039 
 (-0.24) (-0.30)  (-1.57) (-1.63) 
N 817 817  817 817 
Adj. R2 80.56% 80.55%  47.68% 47.75% 
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TABLE 10 Top 4 Executive Pay Ratio and Firm Value/Performance  
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of Tobin’s q and ROA on top 4 executive pay ratio and 
control variables. The dependent variable is one-year-ahead industry-adjusted Tobin’s q in Columns (1) 
and (2) and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted ROA in Columns (3) and (4). Please see Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Statistical significance of the reported coefficients is based on Huber-White robust 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t+1  Industry-adjusted ROA, t+1 
 
Top 4 Pay Ratio =  
(1) 
AverageRatio 
(2) 
EntryRatio 
 (3) 
AverageRatio 
(4) 
EntryRatio 
Top 4 Pay Ratio, t 0.019* 0.012*  0.004** 0.002** 
 (1.69) (1.70)  (2.04) (2.39) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, t 0.883*** 0.883***  0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (29.45) (29.46)  (3.25) (3.26) 
Industry-adjusted ROA, t -0.074 -0.073  0.669*** 0.669*** 
 (-0.27) (-0.26)  (8.57) (8.56) 
CEO Pay Slice, t -0.161 -0.167  0.002 0.002 
 (-1.24) (-1.30)  (0.12) (0.08) 
Governance Index -0.002 -0.002  0.003** 0.003** 
 (-0.31) (-0.32)  (2.01) (2.00) 
Insider Ownership 0.518** 0.517**  -0.008 -0.008 
 (2.11) (2.10)  (-0.17) (-0.16) 
Insider Ownership2 -0.726** -0.728**  -0.022 -0.023 
 (-2.46) (-2.46)  (-0.32) (-0.34) 
Ln(Sales) -0.000 -0.000  0.004* 0.004* 
 (-0.01) (-0.02)  (1.75) (1.75) 
Leverage 0.158** 0.159**  -0.005 -0.005 
 (2.38) (2.39)  (-0.38) (-0.36) 
R&D -0.758 -0.758  -0.146 -0.146 
 (-1.49) (-1.49)  (-1.18) (-1.18) 
R&D Missing -0.021 -0.022  -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.72) (-0.77)  (-0.99) (-1.04) 
Capital Expenditure -0.277 -0.273  -0.150*** -0.150*** 
 (-1.07) (-1.05)  (-3.33) (-3.30) 
Firm Age 0.035 0.035  0.006* 0.006* 
 (1.60) (1.62)  (1.66) (1.67) 
Business Segment Concentration 0.017 0.018  0.011 0.011 
 (0.44) (0.46)  (1.43) (1.45) 
Market Share -0.231 -0.215  -0.025 -0.023 
 (-1.46) (-1.41)  (-0.89) (-0.84) 
Constant -0.078 -0.078  -0.047* -0.047* 
 (-0.63) (-0.63)  (-1.92) (-1.93) 
N 817 817  817 817 
Adj. R2 80.49% 80.49%  47.36% 47.39% 
 
 
